The Genesis of a Conflict: The Unravelling of Darfur

The roots of the Darfur conflict are deeply embedded in the region's complex history, characterised by a confluence of ethnic, economic, and political tensions ^{9, 15, 19, 20}. Located in the western expanse of Sudan, Darfur, meaning "land of the Fur," has historically been a diverse region inhabited by numerous tribes and ethnic groups, broadly categorised as Arab and non-Arab African communities ²⁰. For centuries, these groups, including the Fur, Masalit, and Zaghawa, coexisted, their interactions shaped by patterns of agriculture and pastoralism ^{2, 9}. However, this delicate equilibrium began to fray in the latter half of the twentieth century, exacerbated by environmental degradation and political marginalisation ^{9, 20}.

A significant catalyst for the escalating tensions was the severe drought that afflicted the Sahel region in the 1980s, which intensified competition over scarce resources such as water and arable land ^{9, 20}. This environmental pressure cooker amplified existing grievances between nomadic Arab pastoralists and sedentary non-Arab farming communities ^{9, 20}. The central government in Khartoum, historically dominated by an Arab elite, was widely perceived as neglecting the developmental needs of peripheral regions like Darfur, further fuelling a sense of disenfranchisement among the non-Arab populations ^{9, 19}.

The political landscape of Sudan also played a crucial role in the descent into violence. Since its independence in 1956, the country has been plagued by protracted civil wars, often pitting the central government against marginalised groups in the south and other peripheral areas ^{9, 19}. The government in Khartoum, for its part, often exploited and exacerbated local tensions to maintain its grip on power ^{6, 9}. In the context of Darfur, this manifested in the arming and support of Arab militias to counter perceived threats from non-Arab communities ^{6, 9}.

The simmering tensions erupted into open conflict in early 2003 when two rebel groups, the Sudan Liberation Movement/Army (SLM/A) and the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM), launched attacks against government installations ^{15, 19, 20}. These groups accused the Sudanese government of oppressing Darfur's non-Arab population and demanded greater political and economic representation ^{15, 19}. The government's response was swift and brutal ^{2, 4, 11, 14, 17, 28}. Rather than engaging in a conventional counter-insurgency campaign, the regime of then-President Omar al-Bashir unleashed a scorched-earth policy, heavily relying on a proxy force that would soon become infamous: the Janjaweed ^{2, 4, 11, 14, 17, 28}.

The Rise of the Janjaweed and the "Colonel of Colonels"

The term "Janjaweed," thought to be derived from the Arabic for "a man on a horse with a gun," came to symbolise the terror inflicted upon the civilian population of Darfur ⁶. These militias, primarily composed of Arab pastoralist tribes, were armed, funded, and directed by the Sudanese government to crush the rebellion ^{2, 6, 21}. The Janjaweed's tactics were characterised by extreme brutality, targeting civilians from the same ethnic groups as the rebel movements, namely the Fur, Masalit, and Zaghawa ^{2, 6, 21}. Their raids on villages were often preceded by aerial bombardments from the Sudanese air force, after which the mounted militiamen would sweep in, killing men, raping women, and destroying homes, crops, and water sources ⁶. This systematic campaign of violence was described by many international observers as a form of ethnic cleansing, and in 2004, the United States Secretary of State, Colin Powell, labelled it a genocide ^{2, 6}.

At the heart of this campaign of terror was Ali Muhammad Ali Abd-Al-Rahman, more commonly known by his nom de guerre, Ali Kushayb ^{16, 21}. Born in 1957, Abd-Al-Rahman rose to become a senior leader within the Janjaweed, earning the moniker "aqid al oqada," or "colonel of colonels" ^{16, 34}. He was a pivotal figure in the Wadi Salih locality of West Darfur, where he commanded thousands of Janjaweed fighters ^{7, 21}. His role was not merely that of a distant commander; he was alleged to have been a direct participant in the atrocities, personally leading attacks and issuing orders that resulted in the deaths of countless civilians ^{7, 13, 14}.

Abd-Al-Rahman's authority was derived from his position as a key intermediary between the Janjaweed and the Sudanese government ⁷. He was responsible for recruiting, arming, and supplying the militiamen under his command, effectively operationalising the government's counter-insurgency strategy on the ground ^{7, 21}. Eyewitness accounts and subsequent investigations by human rights organisations painted a chilling picture of his direct involvement in the violence that engulfed Darfur between 2003 and 2004 ^{16, 34}.

The scale of the devastation wrought by the Janjaweed and their government backers was staggering. By 2008, it was estimated that the conflict had resulted in the deaths of approximately 300,000 people and the displacement of over 2.7 million ^{2, 14}. The international community, though slow to react initially, began to take notice of the unfolding humanitarian catastrophe. The African Union deployed a small peacekeeping force in 2004, which was later bolstered by a joint United Nations-African Union mission (UNAMID) in 2008 ^{6, 18}. However, these efforts were often hampered by a lack of resources and the obstruction of the Sudanese government.

The Long Road to The Hague: The Pursuit of Justice

The international legal response to the atrocities in Darfur began to take shape in the mid-2000s. The establishment of the International Criminal Court (ICC) in 2002 provided a new avenue for holding individuals accountable for the most serious crimes of international concern ^{8, 27, 29}. The ICC is a court of last resort, intended to complement national judicial systems when they are unwilling or unable to prosecute such crimes ^{8, 24, 27}. Its jurisdiction covers genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes ^{8, 24, 29}.

In March 2005, the United Nations Security Council, acting under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, adopted Resolution 1593, referring the situation in Darfur to the ICC Prosecutor ^{7, 25}. This was a landmark decision, as it was the first time the Security Council had referred a situation to the Court. The ICC Prosecutor at the time, Luis Moreno-Ocampo, opened an investigation in June 2005 ⁷. Two years later, on the 27th of April 2007, the ICC issued arrest warrants for Ali Kushayb and another Sudanese official, Ahmad Harun, for war crimes and crimes against humanity ^{7, 23, 25}.

Despite the issuance of the arrest warrant, Abd-Al-Rahman remained at large for over a decade. The Sudanese government under Omar al-Bashir refused to cooperate with the ICC, denying the court's jurisdiction and shielding the suspects from justice ⁶. Al-Bashir himself was indicted by the ICC in 2009 for genocide, war crimes, and crimes against humanity, becoming the first sitting head of state to be charged by the court ^{6, 10}.

The political landscape in Sudan shifted dramatically in April 2019 with the ousting of al-Bashir following months of popular protests ¹⁴. The subsequent transitional government signalled a greater willingness to cooperate with the ICC, raising hopes that the long-delayed justice for Darfur might finally be realised ^{10, 14}. In February 2020, the new Sudanese authorities announced their intention to cooperate with the ICC's investigation ¹⁴.

Faced with this changing political climate, Abd-Al-Rahman fled Sudan and sought refuge in the Central African Republic ^{3, 14}. On the 9th of June 2020, he voluntarily surrendered to the authorities in the Central African Republic and was subsequently transferred to the custody of the ICC in The Hague ^{5, 7, 10, 23, 25, 31, 33}. His initial appearance before the court took place on the 15th of June 2020 ^{5, 7, 33}.

The Trial of Ali Kushayb: A Litany of Horrors

The trial of Ali Muhammad Ali Abd-Al-Rahman commenced on the 5th of April 2022, before Trial Chamber I of the International Criminal Court ^{5, 11, 26, 30, 32, 34}. He faced 31 counts of war crimes and crimes against humanity, including murder, rape, torture, persecution, and intentionally directing attacks against a civilian population ^{5, 11, 21, 26, 30, 33}. The charges related to a series of attacks on the towns of Kodoom, Bindisi, Mukjar, and Arawala, and surrounding areas in West Darfur between August 2003 and March 2004 ^{7, 21, 23}.

The prosecution's case was built on a mountain of evidence, including the testimony of 56 witnesses who provided harrowing accounts of the violence they had endured and witnessed ^{3, 5, 26, 28, 30}. Survivors described a systematic campaign of terror designed to drive the non-Arab population from their land ^{3, 21}. Witnesses recounted how Janjaweed fighters, under Abd-Al-Rahman's command, would storm their villages, burning homes, looting property, and indiscriminately killing civilians ^{3, 6}.

A recurring and particularly brutal feature of the attacks was the widespread and systematic use of rape as a weapon of war ^{3, 26, 28, 30}. Women and girls were subjected to horrific sexual violence, often in front of their families, in a deliberate effort to terrorise and humiliate the community ^{3, 26, 28, 30}. The prosecution argued that Abd-Al-Rahman not only knew about these crimes but actively encouraged and participated in them ^{4, 11, 14, 17}. One witness testified that during a massacre, Abd-Al-Rahman had urged his fighters to "repeat" their abuses in case they had "missed" anyone ^{3, 28, 30}.

The trial also heard evidence of Abd-Al-Rahman's direct involvement in the killing of civilians. He was accused of ordering the summary execution of scores of prisoners in March 2004 and of personally bludgeoning two men to death with an axe ^{11, 14, 17}. Presiding Judge Joanna Korner, in reading out the verdict, detailed an incident where Abd-Al-Rahman had overseen the loading of approximately 50 civilians onto trucks, some of whom were beaten with axes, before they were forced to lie on the ground and were shot dead by his troops ¹⁴.

Throughout the trial, Abd-Al-Rahman maintained his innocence, claiming that he was a victim of mistaken identity and that he was not the infamous Ali Kushayb ^{3, 11, 13, 14, 30, 32}. His defence team called 18 witnesses and argued that he was an "anonymous pharmacist" and "a no one" who had no involvement in the Darfur conflict ^{5, 17, 28, 30, 32}. However, the judges unanimously rejected this defence, noting that he had even identified himself by his name and nickname in a video when he surrendered ^{11, 14, 17}.

The Verdict and its Ramifications

On the 6th of October 2025, the three-judge panel of the International Criminal Court delivered its unanimous verdict, finding Ali Muhammad Ali Abd-Al-Rahman guilty on 27 counts of war crimes and crimes against humanity ^{3, 4, 12, 14, 22, 30, 37, 38}. The court ruled that the atrocities were part of a government plan to violently suppress the rebellion in Darfur ^{4, 11, 14, 17, 28, 38}. The judges declined to deliver verdicts on four charges, considering them to be covered by other charges for which he was convicted ³⁰. Abd-Al-Rahman now faces a maximum sentence of life imprisonment, which will be determined at a later date ^{3, 4, 11, 17, 28, 30, 38}.

The conviction of Ali Kushayb is a landmark moment for the International Criminal Court and for the cause of international justice ^{5, 22}. It is the first conviction secured by the court for the atrocities committed in Darfur, a conflict that has been on the ICC's agenda for two decades ^{3, 4, 5, 14, 22, 28, 38}. The verdict sends a powerful message that those who commit the most heinous crimes will be held accountable, no matter how long it takes ¹⁷.

For the victims of the Darfur conflict, the conviction represents a long-awaited, albeit partial, measure of justice ^{17, 35}. For years, they have lived with the physical and psychological scars of the violence, while the perpetrators remained at large and unpunished. The trial provided a platform for their voices to be heard and for their suffering to be officially acknowledged on the world stage ³⁵. The UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, Volker Türk, welcomed the verdict, stating that it was an "important acknowledgment of the enormous suffering endured by the victims of his heinous crimes" ³⁵.

The conviction also has significant implications for the ongoing situation in Sudan. Since April 2023, the country has been engulfed in a new and devastating conflict between the Sudanese Armed Forces and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF), a paramilitary group that evolved from the Janjaweed militias ^{3, 14, 17, 26, 30}. The current conflict has seen a resurgence of ethnically motivated violence in Darfur, with the RSF and its allied militias targeting non-Arab communities in a manner chillingly reminiscent of the atrocities of the early 2000s ^{2, 14, 17, 26, 30}. The conviction of a key Janjaweed leader may serve as a deterrent to those committing crimes in the current conflict, reminding them that impunity is not guaranteed ³⁵.

However, the road to full accountability for the crimes committed in Darfur is far from over. Several other high-profile suspects, including former President Omar al-Bashir and Ahmad Harun, remain at large or have not been transferred to the ICC's custody ^{4, 10, 14}. The successful prosecution of Ali Kushayb will undoubtedly increase the pressure on the Sudanese authorities and the international community to ensure that these individuals also face justice.

The conviction of Ali Muhammad Ali Abd-Al-Rahman is a testament to the resilience of the victims and the tenacity of those who have fought for justice for Darfur. It is a stark reminder of the horrors that were inflicted upon the people of the region and a beacon of hope that, even in the face of immense challenges, the arc of the moral universe can, and does, bend towards justice.